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This paper extends the standard New Keynesian model by incorporating labor adjustment
costs and overtime work. I show that labor frictions help reconcile the frequent price changes
found in the microdata with the degree of sluggishness in in‡ation adjustment to output changes
at the macro level.
The introduction of labor frictions a¤ects the dynamic behavior of economic variables (par-
ticularly employment and in‡ation) and implies that …rms marginal costs should be measured
in overtime costs. Marginal costs measured in overtime hours are procyclical and are predicted
by in‡ation as suggested by theory.
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11 Introduction
Models that combine price stickiness with monopoly power at the …rm level (New Keynesian Phillips
Curve models) have become standard speci…cations and contributed greatly to a better understand-
ing of short-run in‡ation dynamics. It is normally assumed, in this class of models, that production
factors are purchased in a spot market. Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005), Wood-
ford (2005), Sveen and Weinke (2004) have departed from this and studied the implications for
sticky price models of standard restrictions to capital formation conventional in investment theory
(capital becomes productive with a one period delay and is subject to adjustment costs).
In this paper I extend the departure from rental spot markets to the labor input. Following Hall
(1996), I assume that …rms must commit to the number of workers they will employ before observing
shocks to the economy, but are free to adjust the number of employees working overtime in response
to economic changes1. I di¤er from Hall by assuming that …rms have monopoly power, are subject
to Calvo price stickiness and face convex adjustment costs in changing their full time workers2.
The introduction of labor frictions signi…cantly alters employment and in‡ation dynamics. In labor
frictions model, in‡ation rises on impact in response to a TFP and government expenses shock
(the opposite happens in the absence of labor frictions). In this model, hours rise in response to a
positive TFP shock. Suggesting that a sticky price model that is consistent with the micro evidence
on price stickiness may no longer be characterized by a negative response from labor to productivity
shocks. In the case of a government expenses or monetary policy shock, most of the ‡uctuations
in hours is due to changes in overtime work and not employment numbers. Labor frictions also
signi…cantly increases the e¤ect of exogenous shocks in economic variables. Both models seem to
have di¢culty in matching the volatility of overtime employment observed in the data. The model
1Overtime employment appears to adjust more rapidly than full time employment to output innovations (Hansen
and Sargent (1988)). Other empirical studies (Hamermesh (93)) con…rm that hours per worker are adjusted more
rapidly than employment.
2Empirical studies at the micro level indicate that labor adjustment costs are quite signi…cant (see Hamermesh
and Pfann (96) for a survey), with some suggesting they amount to as much as one year payroll for the average
worker.
2with no adjustment costs is not able to make overtime work su¢ciently volatile (its volatility is
always the same as regular employment) and the model with labor adjustment costs it seems to be
too much volatile.
Perhaps of even greater importance, the introduction of labor frictions allows a reinterpretation
of econometric estimations of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, which were thought to imply im-
plausible large periods of price stickiness. My analysis indicates that if labor frictions are taken into
account then low estimates of the marginal cost coe¢cient of the NKPC are perfectly compatible
with frequent price adjustments by …rms. The same e¤ect can be seen in the …rm-speci…c capital
models but to a much smaller extent. The reason for this is that labor represents a much larger
share of …rms costs than capital.
The intuition is as follows: with a rental market in labor employment increases in demand in
one part of the economy bid up the price of inputs for all …rms. If …rm speci…c factor markets are
introduced - either in capital or labor - then an increase in demand in one part of the economy
increases the shadow value of capital or labor there but has no immediate e¤ect in other parts of the
economy. This induces price adjusting …rms to keep their relative price close to the non-adjusters.
Hence, a given degree of sluggishness in the adjustment of in‡ation to changes in output, can be
reconciled with a greater degree of …rm-level ‡exibility of prices, in the cases where one assumes
more speci…c factors of production.
At the empirical level, Batini, Jackson and Nickell (2005), had already presented evidence of a
great importance of labor adjustment costs in NKPC estimation, by correcting the labor share, as
a marginal cost measure, using changes in employment. However, when employment is predeter-
mined, marginal costs should be measured in terms of overtime costs. I construct marginal cost
measures based on overtime costs3 and use them to estimate the NKPC. The resulting coe¢cient
estimates do not signi…cantly di¤er from those obtained using the labor share. Unlike the labor
3Bills (87) also considers marginal costs to be a function of overtime work. Bills constructs his measure of marginal
costs using data on average hours per worker (which includes part time workers) in the manufacturing industry and
estimating the marginal wage schedule.
In the model considered here, it is assumed that all workers are full time workers (an assumption Bills does not
make) and marginal costs are computed from data on overtime work in nonagricultural industries. In this case, there
is no need to specify the derivative of overtime hours with respect to average hours and estimate the marginal wage
schedule.
3share, marginal costs measured in overtime are procyclical and seem to be Granger caused by in‡a-
tion as predicted by the NKPC model. Regressions using forecasted values of marginal costs using
overtime also seem to …t the data signi…cantly better than using the labor share.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, presents a brief analysis of
employment and hours worked. Section 3 describes my new Keynesian model with overtime work
and labor adjustment costs. Section 4 displays my calibration assumptions. Section 5 contains the
implications of labor frictions for price frequency adjustment. In section 6, I estimate the NKPC
using marginal cost measures based on overtime costs. In section 7, I simulate and compare a
model with labor frictions with a model with no labor frictions. Section 8 summarizes the paper’s
…ndings. The appendix contains a description of the data used, all tables, …gures and more detailed
derivations of some of my results.
2 A quick look at the empirical evidence on hours worked
In this analysis I make use of aggregate data on U.S. nonagricultural industries. N0 denotes the
number of partial-time workers (persons who worked between 1 and 34 hours in a week), N1 the
number of full time workers (persons who worked 35 hours and over), N2 corresponds to overtime
employment (number of persons who worked 41 hours and over) and N will denote total employment
(N=N0+N1, since N2 is a subset of N1).
In …gure 1 of the appendix, we see total hours corresponding to these categories plotted over
time. We can see, without surprise, that the bulk of total hours worked4 is composed mainly by
the variable N1_hrs (total hours worked by full time workers, during the straight shift - which is
assumed to be constant at 40 hours a week), with full time workers representing more than 75%
of the workforce (table 1)5. It is also this variable that explains most of the total hours volatility
(with a covariance of 84% with total hour worked), as can be seen in table 3, implying that most
‡uctuation in aggregate hours worked comes from the extensive margin, i.e., from workers moving
in and out of the labor force. Whereas in standard versions of the New Keynesian model all
‡uctuations in employment are along the intensive margin (that is, all the variation is in hours
4N_hrs=N0_hrs+N1_hrs+N2_hrs
5The model developed here assumes that all workers are full time workers, does representing accurately the vast
majority of the workforce.
4per worker)6. The numbers in table 3 also clearly show that employment changes explain most of
the ‡uctuation in hours in each category (95% for part time hours, 100% for full time hours (by
assumption) and 79% for overtime hours).
Despite the fact that employment ‡uctuations causes most of the changes in total hours, over-
time work has important cyclical properties that make it particularly relevant for business cycle
study. Overtime employment appears to adjust more rapidly than straight time employment to
economic changes (Hansen and Sargent (1988)). Indicating that many …rms are very likely con-
strained in the short run in adjusting their total employment and resort to overtime work in order to
respond to unexpected ‡uctuations. This makes overtime employment, maybe a better candidate
to proxy …rms marginal cost than total hours worked.
To make this more clear, I make use of the HP …lter to isolate the cyclical components of real
GDP, N0, N1 and N2 (in this analysis, all variables are in logarithms and in per capita terms). The
cyclical component of overtime employment is almost twice as volatile as that of full time workers
(and more than twice of the volatility of real GDP - see table 4) and seems to be much more
responsive to HP detrended output changes than any of the other employment variables (table 5).
Another reason to introduce overtime work to NKPC models is their inability to amplify and
propagate shocks (see Chari, Kehoe and McGratten (2000)). Hall (1996) shows that the di¤erenti-
ation from straight time and overtime is a more successful mechanism than e¤ort in doing so. It is
also relevant to note, that overtime employment has the advantage over e¤ort of being observable
and measurable.
Taken together these facts indicate that it is important to di¤erentiate straight time employment
from overtime employment in the study of business cycles. The model developed in the following
section, allows agents to move in and out of the workforce and by introducing labor frictions in
total employment, it is also compatible with an important role for cyclical overtime employment
‡uctuations.
6Among the few exceptions are: Walsh (2005), Trigari (2005) and Blanchard and Gali (2006).
53 The Model Economy: An overtime model with labor frictions
3.1 Agents










Each household is endowed with T units of time each period. L can take one of three values7:
-T if the agent is unemployed;
-T-t1 if the agent is employed but works the straight shift only;
-T-t1-t2 if the agent works both the straight and overtime shift.
I follow Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) and employ lotteries to convexify the commodity
space. The end result is the utility speci…cation below (see appendix for details), similar to the one





1 ￿   a1(N1;t   N2;t)   a2N2;t   a0(1   N1;t)] (2)
Where a0 =  v 1
1 ￿;a1 =  v 1
1 ￿(1   h1)1 ￿;a2 =  v 1
1 ￿(1   h1   h2)1 ￿; h1 = t1/T, h2 =
t2/T (in order to normalize to unity the household’s time endowment), N1;t is the share of agents
who work the straight time shift (full time employment) and N2;t is the share of workers who work
both shifts (overtime employment). This representative agent is subject to the following sequences
of budget constraints:
Ct = (Dt + W1;th1N1;t + W2;th2N2;t + Tt + TRt   Et fQt;t+1Dt+1g)=Pt (3)
Ct is the consumption of the …nal good, Pt is the price of the …nal good, W1t is the nominal
hourly wage of the straight shift, W2t is the nominal hourly wage of the overtime shift, Dt is the
nominal payo¤ of the portfolio held at the end of period t, Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor,
TRt are government transfers and Tt denotes …rms pro…ts. The price of a one period bond is given
by R 1
t = EtQt;t+1 where Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate.
The resulting …rst order conditions are:
7The fact that employment changes explain most of the ‡uctuation in hours in each category (table 3) indicates
this is not a very limiting assumption.
6Qt;t+1 = ￿(Ct+1=Ct) ￿(Pt=Pt+1) (4)
Ct
 ￿w2;th2 + a1   a2 = 0 (5)
Ct
 ￿w1;th1 + a0   a1 = 0 (6)
with
w2;t = W2;t=Pt (7)
w1;t = W1;t=Pt (8)
3.2 Firms
3.2.1 Final Good Firms
The …nal consumption good, Yt, is produced by a perfectly competitive representative …rm. The
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Pro…t maximization implies the following demand for the ith good:
Yit = (Pt=Pit)￿Yt (10)






it di]1=(1 ￿) (11)
3.2.2 Intermediate Good Firms
Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolist …rm according to the following production
function:
Yi;t = AtNi;t (12)
Ni;t = (h1N1 ￿
1;t (i) + h2N1 ￿
2;t (i)) (13)
The above production function is similar to the one used by Hall (1996). Like Hall, I assume
N1;t(i) must be chosen before the shocks to the economy are known8. Intermediate good producers
8Studies using aggregate quarterly data, summarized in Hamermesh (93), show the average lag in adjusting
employment demand to be three to 6 months.





Where Hit represent purchases by the …rm of the …nal good. The function H(.) is an increasing
and convex function, of the usual kind assumed in neoclassical investment theory, which satis…es
near a zero growth rate of employment, H(1)=￿N1, H’(1)=1 and H”(1)=￿ N1, where ￿N1is an
exogenous separation rate and the parameter ￿ N1 measures the employment adjustment costs
in a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics. This implies that in the steady state
(assumed constant, as I abstract from economic growth) to which the economy converges in the
absence of shocks, the rate of hiring required to maintain the economy’s employment is ￿N1 times
the steady state employment N1 (so that ￿N1 can be interpreted as the exogenous quit rate in
employment). It also implies that near the steady state, a marginal unit in hiring expenses increases
employment by an equal amount (as there are locally no adjustment costs). These assumptions are
similar to those made by Woodford (2005) and Sveen and Weinke(2004) in a context of investment
adjustment costs.




Qt;t+j[Pi;t+jYi;t+j Pt+jw1;t+jh1N1;t+j(i) Pt+jw2;t+jh2N2;t+j(i) Pt+jHi;t+j] (15)
The ith intermediate good …rm chooses Pi;t+j;Yi;t+j;N1;t+j+1(i);N2;t+j(i) to maximize pro…ts
subject to (10), (12), (14),as well as its price setting constraints. The …rm takes Pt+j, Yt+j;W1;t+j;W2;t+j
as given.
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w2t
(1 ￿)AtN ￿
2;t (i) = MCit (17)
H0(
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￿i;t+1 =  w1;t+1h1 + w2;t+1h2
MPN1;t+1(i)
MPN2;t+1(i) (19)
9Sargent (78) and Shapiro (86) using aggregate data estimated adjustment costs for overtime to be much smaller
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and ￿t;j = (￿t+j=￿t) = (Ct+j=Ct) ￿;￿ = ￿=(￿   1) is the steady state markup if price over
marginal cost, ￿ is the probability the …rm will not be able to optimally reset its price this period.
It is worth some time to look at equation (17). When the straight time employment is pre-
determined, the relevant measure of a …rm’s marginal cost is its overtime labor costs and not its
total labor input. The empirical literature (Gali and Gertler (1999) for example) has so far focused
on the labor share or output gap to proxy marginal costs. In chapter 6 I construct measures of
marginal cost based on overtime costs. The estimates however do not prove to be signi…cantly
di¤erent from those obtained using the labor share.
The …rst order condition for the …rm’s price setting behavior is similar to the standard Calvo
model (price is a function of all future expected marginal costs). However, since a …rm’s choice of
full time employment is among the determinants of its marginal product of labor, I cannot solve
the price setting problem without considering the …rm’s optimal employment behavior. The reason
for this is that N1 is not purchased on a spot market. Workers are contracted to one …rm only and
the existence of convex adjustment costs prevents a more rapid adjustment of a …rm’s number of
workers. A …rm’s marginal cost therefore depends on its present full time employment numbers and
these depend on the …rm’s decisions in previous periods, including its price-setting decisions. The
…rm’s choices here are more complex than in standard sticky price models (which typically assume
rental markets for production factors) but the problem is very similar to the case of …rm-speci…c
capital solved by Woodford (2005).
Equation (18) takes a similar form to the F.O.C. for the …rm’s investment decision found in
Sveen and Weinke (2004) or Woodford (2005). It is noteworthy that a …rm’s marginal return to N1
is measured by the marginal savings in its overtime costs as opposed to its marginal productivity.
This arises from the …rms being demand constrained, which implies that the …rm’s bene…t from
having an additional worker derives from the fact that this allows to produce the quantity demanded
with less overtime work.
3.3 Aggregate resource constraint
The economy’s resource constraint is:






and Gt denotes government expenses.
3.4 In‡ation Dynamics
From now on, I will use lower case letters to denote variables in log deviation from the steady state.
The economy’s price in‡ation equation takes the form (see appendix for details):
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿mct (23)




N1, in the homogeneous factors model ￿N1 = 1) which is computed numerically
using the method developed in Woodford (2005). Woodford (2005) shows that a non-explosive
solution to the …rm’s decision problem exists in the case of large enough adjustment costs. The
introduction of labor frictions does therefore not imply any important change in the dynamic
relationship between in‡ation and average real marginal cost in comparison to the baseline NKPC
model (see Yun (1996)).
3.5 Monetary Policy Rule
When prices are sticky the equilibrium path of real variables cannot be determined independently of
monetary policy. In other words: monetary policy is non-neutral. The model is closed by assuming
the central bank follows a simple interest rule (often referred to as a “Taylor" rule) of the form:
it = ￿￿￿t + ￿yyt + ev
t (24)
This rule has desirable stabilizing properties10 and also some empirical appeal as a description
of what central banks do in practice.
10The central bank chooses a target for the short term interest rate, as a function of economic conditions. To attain
that rate, the central bank adjusts the money supply to meet the quantity on money demanded at the target interest
rate. This is preferable than doing the reverse (set the nominal money stock and let the interest rate adjust), due
to the potential instability of money demand suggested by the evidence. Under monetary targeting, this instability
would translate into interest rate volatility that could harm the real economy.
103.6 Exogenous Shocks
It is assumed that the monetary policy shock, government spending and technology follow an
exogenous process AR(1) process:
ev
t+1 = $vev
t + "t+1 (25)
gt+1 = $ggt + e
g
t+1 (26)





t represent shocks distributed independently N(0, 1).
3.7 An overtime model with no labor adjustment costs
For comparison I consider a model where N1 is not predetermined and without labor adjustment
costs in total employment. Only equations 18 and 21 are di¤erent. These are replaced by:
w1t
(1 ￿)AtN ￿
1;t (i) = MCit (28)
Yt = Ct + Gt (29)




1 ￿+￿￿. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale
(￿ = 0) there is no di¤erence between this case and standard NKPC model with homogeneous
factors.
4 Calibration
The period length is one quarter. I assume a value of one for ￿, the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. I set the discount rate ￿ = 0:99 and choose ￿ = 7:6667 which implies a frictionless
steady state markup of 15%. The agents time endowment T is set at 1369, implying agent’s have
15 hours per day available for work and leisure activities.
The parameters regarding work hours and employment are set equal to their time series sample
means (see tables 1 and 2). Therefore the steady state values of t1, t2, N1 and N2 equal 516, 155,
0.42 and 0.16 respectively. The representative agent’s leisure utility parameter v and labor supply
elasticity are calibrated so that N1=0.42 and N2=0.16. The capital share ￿ is 0.33 and the GDP
share of government expenses equals 0.2, both are standard values in the business cycle literature.
The quit rate in employment (￿N1) is chosen to be 0.1 (consistent with the empirical evidence for
11the U.S., see Shimmer (2005)) and ￿ N1, the curvature on labor adjustment costs, to be 211 (a
value consistent with Cooper and Willis (2002) estimates).
For the Taylor rule I choose the in‡ation and output weights ( ￿￿;￿y) to be 1.5 and 0.5/4
respectively. These parameters are roughly consistent with observed variations in the Federal
Funds rate over the Greenspan era (see Taylor (1999)).
The shock processes parameters were obtained by OLS estimation12. The autoregressive para-
meters are set at $a = 0:99;$g = 0:99 and $v = 0:7313.
Finally the New Keynesian Phillips curve coe¢cient for marginal cost ￿ is set to be 0.02, which
is consistent with empirical estimates (see Gali and Gertler (1999)).
5 Implications for the frequency of price adjustment
The non-linear estimates of the NKPC imply a period of price stickiness much larger than that
found using micro data. The Calvo price staggering assumption implies an average time period
for which a price is …xed of 1/(1-￿). The typical value estimated, ￿=0.8, then implies an average
period of price stickiness of 5 quarters. Klenow and Kryvstov (2005), estimate the mean monthly
fraction of items changing prices, using micro data collected from the three largest metropolitan
areas (New York, Los Angeles and Chicago), I report these estimates in table 6. These estimates
imply an average time period between price changes of 3.4 months (average period lengths are
calculated by 1/fr) for all prices (4.3 months if we exclude sales). These imply values of ￿ of 0.12
for all prices and 0.3 if one exclude sales (table ).
In this section, I explore how the labor rigidities introduced14, help reconcile this apparent
11This implies, that for a 5% change in employment, adjustment costs are about 4.2% of output per quarter. This
is about twice larger than the estimates by Shapiro (86). However, it falls considerably short of what accounting
studies indicate (reviewed in Hamermesh and Pfann (96)).





. G is goverment current expenditures. All variables were
converted to per capita terms. The OLS regressions consist of : log(At) = c + (log At 1) + e
a
t;log(Gt) = c + (log
Gt 1) + e
g
t: The resulting estimates are standard and close to Hall’s (96).
13A series for the monetary policy shock e
v
t was obtained by: e
v
t = FFt   1:5￿t   0:125yt:Where FF correspondes
to the federal funds rate, ￿ to in‡ation and y to HP detrended real GDP per capita. $v was then obtained by means





14The results in this section aren’t necessarily linked to marginal costs measured in overtime. One could still have
12discrepancy between macro and micro estimations. Table 7 shows the implied values of ￿ for
several values of ￿ for the homogeneous factor markets, the …rm-speci…c capital model, a model
with a decreasing returns to scale production function (capital is absent from canonical versions of
the New Keynesian model) and the model with labor frictions. We can see that allowing capital
to be …rm-speci…c implies a signi…cant reduction in the implied price stickiness value (the values
of ￿ vary between 0.7 and 0.6), yet it still falls very far behind the values in the micro estimations,
especially for the lowest values of ￿. Adding labor frictions, has a much larger e¤ect, with ￿ varying
between 0.4 and 0.3. Even for the lowest values of ￿, the average price duration implied by the
labor frictions model seems to be quite consistent with the micro evidence. In the same table we
can see that while the use of a decreasing returns to scale production function in this model, implies
by itself a reduction in price stickiness in comparison to the homogeneous factors case, the largest
contribution is due to the introduction of labor frictions.
The intuition is as follows: with a rental market in labor employment increases in demand in
one part of the economy bid up the price of inputs for all …rms. If …rm speci…c factor markets are
introduced - either in capital or labor - then an increase in demand in one part of the economy
increases the shadow value of capital or labor there but has no immediate e¤ect in other parts of the
economy. This induces price adjusting …rms to keep their relative price close to the non-adjusters.
Hence, a given degree of sluggishness in the adjustment of in‡ation to changes in output, can be
reconciled with a greater degree of …rm-level ‡exibility of prices, in the cases where one assumes
more speci…c factors of production.
I perform some experiments in order to discover why the results of the labor-frictions model di¤er
from the …rm-speci…c capital model. I hold the value of ￿ …xed at 0.02 and test the sensitivity of the
labor frictions model solution to di¤erent parameter calibrations. My analysis indicates that the
explanation lies in the output share of the constrained production factor (in the …rm-speci…c capital
model, the constrained factor share is only a third, whereas in the labor frictions model described
in section 3 it represents more than 80%). I …nd that the labor adjustment cost parameters, ￿ N1
and ￿N1; have a very small e¤ect.
The output share of the constrained production factor was found to have a greater in‡uence on
a model with predetermined employment but in which …rms are free to adjust the use of raw materials, instead of
overtime, to react to unexpected ‡uctuations.
13￿, it seems that capital does not represent a large enough proportion of a …rm’s costs, in order for
the introduction of realistic levels of frictions in this factor, to reduce su¢ciently the elasticity of
the desired price with respect to output. Table 8 shows that if the capital share in the …rm-speci…c
capital model were to be double of the labor share (the unconstrained production factor in this
model) it would imply ￿ = 0:569; a signi…cantly smaller value. Alternatively, reducing the size of
the full time labor input relative to the overtime input (the factor free of frictions) in the labor
frictions model leads to a great rise in the implied period between price adjustments. Lowering the
steady state value of N1 to 0.20 and t1=200 results in a value of ￿ equal to 0.634.
Table 9, shows the results of alternative parameter speci…cations of the labor adjustment cost
function. Price frequency seems to be practically una¤ected by these.
6 Estimation of the NKPC with overtime costs
6.1 Constructing a marginal cost measure based on overtime work
I start by describing how I constructed a measure of real marginal cost in log deviations from the
steady state. I obtain overtime wages by multiplying W (compensation per hour in the nonfarm
business sector) by 1.5 (assuming a constant 50% wage premium for overtime). I then multiply
overtime wages by N2 and h2 = 155, and divide the resulting series by GDP. This gives a measure
of real marginal cost consistent with the model described in chapter 3. Finally, I take the log of the
resulting series and subtract its mean. Assuming the overtime shift and the overtime premium to
be constant may appear to be a serious limitation, but the results are indi¤erent to the choice of
value (since I later demean the series). I also construct an alternative measure of real marginal cost
that uses average overtime hours (this series is plotted in …gure 3) , instead of assuming a constant









Where N_hrs denotes total hours worked in nonagricultural industries and N2 the number of
persons who worked 41 hours or more.
Table 10 presents some summary statistics regarding in‡ation and these marginal cost measures.
14The overtime marginal costs measures are about 4 times more volatile than the labor share. Unlike
the labor share, these measures are procyclical (consistent with Bills (86) results). As Woodford
(2003) pointed out, increases in output that are not driven by increases in technological e¢ciency
will tend
to raise nominal marginal costs more than prices in a broad class of standard models, as workers
require a higher real wage in order to be induced to supply extra hours. For this reason, several
authors15 have argued that the labor share is not a good proxy for marginal costs. Using overtime
data to construct marginal cost measures seems to address this criticism.
Preliminary analysis indicates that assuming overtime hours to be constant is not a signi…cant
limitation. Figure 4 shows us that these marginal cost measures follow each other quite closely.
These series correlation coe¢cient is 0.832.
6.2 Estimation of the NKPC
I estimate the NKPC by GMM, making use of the orthonogonality condition:
Et f(￿￿t   (1   ￿)(1   ￿￿)mct   ￿￿￿t+1)ztg (30)
This allows the direct estimation of the of the structural parameters ￿ and ￿, using aggregate
data. The instrument set zt is composed of four lags of in‡ation, the marginal cost variable,
the output gap (HP detrended real GDP), the log-short interest rate spread, wage in‡ation and
commodity price in‡ation.
The results for both marginal cost measures considered can be found in table 11 and seem to
indicate that assuming overtime hours to be constant is not a serious limitation (the unrestricted
regression using overtime hours yields a beta value superior to one, but restricting the value to one
does not a¤ect the estimation of ￿). The results for the nonlinear estimations are very similar (￿
is about 0.8) to those obtained by Gali and Gertler (1999) using the labor share as a measure of
marginal cost and a similar set of instruments.
These estimates are not valid under the assumptions regarding labor frictions (predetermined
employment and convex adjustment costs) made in chapter 3. In this case it is only possible to
15Rudd and Whelan (2007), point out that the labor share tends to jump upward and reach a local peak near the
onset of the NBER recessions. For the labor share to be a good proxy for real marginal costs and for real marginal
cost to be positively correlated with the output gap, would imply that output was actually above potential during
each postwar recession.
15obtain direct estimates of ￿ and ￿ (this is also the case when capital is …rm-speci…c). I now estimate
these parameters directly, using the moment condition:
Et f(￿t   ￿mct   ￿￿t+1)ztg (31)
The linear regressions (table 12) using overtime marginal cost measures yield a small negative
coe¢cient (not signi…cant) for ￿, but positive values fall within the con…dence interval.
Overall, these results are not very di¤erent from those reported by Gali and Gertler (1999) who
reported similarly high coe¢cients for ￿ (which varied between 0.829 and 0.915) and low values of
￿ (which varied between 0.007 and 0.047).
Perhaps a better way to assess the empirical performance of the NKPC is to construct explicit





using a VAR to forecast the values of mct+j in a manner similar to Campbell and Shiller’s
(1987) methodology, the discounted sum of expected marginal costs is then obtained using a value
of ￿ equal to 0.99.
Can in‡ation be used to construct forecasts of future values of the driving term? If the NKPC
model is correct then lagged in‡ation would embody preceding periods expectations about future
marginal costs, and thus should probably add useful forecasting value to the VAR. Rudd and
Whelan (2007) show that the hypothesis that in‡ation Granger causes the labor share is clearly
rejected by the data. In table 13, I show the results of an OLS regression of the labor share on 4
lags of in‡ation. The R2 is only 0.015 and the F-statistic, with a value of 0.477, con…rms Rudd
and Whelan’s results that lagged in‡ation does not Granger cause employment. In this aspect,
the results for the overtimeshare_h2 are remarkably di¤erent (see table 14). An OLS regression
of this variable on 4 lags of in‡ation, yields an R2 of 0.206 and the F-statistic value is zero, which
clearly supports the hypothesis that in‡ation Granger causes the overtimeshare_h2 marginal cost
measure. These are encouraging results in favor of using a marginal cost measure based on overtime
costs and may account for the presence of lagged in‡ation in conventional empirical Phillips curves.
This suggests that forecasting values of Etmct+j using a VAR in overtimeshare_h2 and in‡ation
may prove useful. The Schwarz criterion selects a lag order of two for both the overtimeshare_h2
variable and the labor share (despite the absence of Granger causality in the labor share case,
I perform the same exercise for comparison purposes). The OLS regression again yields a small
16estimate of ￿ in both cases (see results in table 15 and 16). With this method a signi…cant coe¢cient
for the overtimeshare_h2 is estimated, although with the wrong expected sign (￿=-0.017). In the
case of the labor share, the coe¢cient has the right sign but is not signi…cant (￿=0.014). Another
great di¤erence, is the Adj. R2 of the two regressions, the labor share’s is only 0.002 while in the
overtimeshare_h2 case it is 0.741.
Estimating the same equation in …rst di¤erences yields ￿=0.015 for both marginal cost mea-
sures (again, only signi…cant for the overtimeshare_h2). In this case also, the Adj. R2 of the
regression with the overtimeshare_h2 (Adj. R2=0.17) is much higher than for the labor share
(Adj. R2=0.001).
The analysis made in this section indicates that marginal costs measured in overtime have a
more robust link to the output gap, in‡ation and changes in in‡ation.
7 Impulse response functions and business cycle statistics
The introduction of labor frictions signi…cantly alters employment and in‡ation dynamics. In labor
frictions model, in‡ation rises on impact in response to a TFP and government expenses shock
(the opposite happens in the absence of labor frictions). In this model, hours rise in response to a
positive TFP shock. Suggesting that a sticky price model that is consistent with the micro evidence
on price stickiness may no longer be characterized by a negative response from labor to productivity
shocks. In the case of a government expenses or monetary policy shock, most of the ‡uctuations
in hours is due to changes in overtime work and not employment numbers. Labor frictions also
signi…cantly increases the e¤ect of exogenous shocks in economic variables. Both models seem to
have di¢culty in matching the volatility of overtime employment observed in the data. The model
with no adjustment costs is not able to make overtime work su¢ciently volatile (its volatility is
always the same as regular employment) and the model with labor adjustment costs it seems to be
too much volatile.
7.1 Business cycle statistics
The business cycle statistics for the TFP shock, government expenses shock and monetary shock
are displayed in tables 17-19. Several key di¤erences can be observed between the model with and
17without labor frictions.
In the model with labor frictions, the e¤ect of exogenous shocks is considerably magni…ed (this
is consistent with Hall’s results). The TFP shock’s volatility is only 66% relative to output (143%
without frictions) and the monetary policy shock only 36% (93% without frictions). The surprising
exception is the government expenses shock, in this case the model with labor frictions requires
about twice the volatility in this shock in comparison to the model with no frictions, to generate
the same response in output.
The introduction of labor frictions leads to decrease in straight time employment volatility
(except in the case of the TFP shock) and a great increase in overtime employment volatility.
Without frictions both variables have the same volatility (about the same as output). In the
data overtime is indeed more volatile than straight time employment but the labor frictions model
seems largely exceeds it. This occurs because with labor frictions …rms can only adjust overtime
employment in the short-run making this variable extremely volatile. This e¤ect is particularly
strong in the government expenses and monetary shock cases (for these shocks overtime is more
than 9 times more volatile than output) than in the TFP case (the relative volatility of overtime
to output is 3.2 which is fairly close to the data)16. In all of these shocks, the volatility of "net
hiring" (denoted as h) is always considerably high (always several times more volatile than output)
, which means the problem is not so much that there are no movements in people going in and out
of the workforce but that there is really too much movement in overtime employment.
For the TFP case, straight time employment is more volatile for the model with frictions than for
the model without frictions, whereas the opposite happens for the other shocks. This is very likely
due to the reason that the government expenses shock and monetary shocks in‡uence employment
decisions through its e¤ects on interest rates (it is better to work more and consume less in periods
with high real interest rates), there are no e¤ects in productivity. This may also be the reason
why in these shocks overtime is much more volatile. The change in real interest rate may not be
a su¢cient motive for many agents to enter or leave the work force, leading to need to make large
adjustments in overtime use.
Real wages volatility, for all shocks, in the labor frictions model is much smaller (about half) in
16Hall’s (96) model su¤ers from the reverse problem, in his case overtime employment is about 4 times less volatile
than the data.
18comparison to the model with no frictions (which always generates higher volatility of wages relative
to output when the opposite happens in the data). This result is likely due to the introduction of
convex labor adjustment costs. On the other hand, marginal costs are more volatile in the model
with labor frictions, this is consistent with the data (see table 10) that strongly suggests that
marginal costs when measured in overtime employment are considerably more volatile. This means
also that the introduction of labor frictions changes which variables a¤ect more the volatility of
marginal costs (and therefore in‡ation), without frictions, wage movements play a relatively larger
role.
Another large di¤erence between the two models is the contemporaneous correlation of output
with regards to the productivity shock. In the model without frictions several variables (employ-
ment/hours, in‡ation and marginal costs) are countercyclical. Since these variables are clearly
procyclical in the data, this model is not compatible with a large role for TFP shocks in explain-
ing business cycles17. The introduction of labor frictions allows TFP shocks to play a larger role
observed cyclical movements in economic variables.
7.2 Impulse response functions
We can also see great di¤erences in the IRFs between the models with and without labor adjustment
costs (see …gures 6-11). When adjustment costs are present N1 exhibits a "hump" shaped response
to shocks. In the model with labor frictions, overtime work, total hours, marginal cost, in‡ation and
output have larger reactions to shocks on impact. These reactions tend to be short lived because
they are driven mostly by overtime employment. Firms cannot adjust straight time employment in
the short run, so they must resort to overtime employment. Since overtime wages are higher, …rms
decrease their overtime use as quickly as possible.
Impulse response functions between these models di¤er dramatically in the case of a TFP
17Gali (1999) has fueled the debate on the importance of technology shocks as a business cycle impulse. Gali uses a
structural VAR that he identi…es by assuming that technology shocks are the only source of long-run changes in labor
productivity. He …nds that in the short run, hours worked fall in response to a positive shock to technology.Gali’s
results have sparked an animated, ongoing debate. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003) …nd that Gali’s
results are not robust to specifying
the VAR in terms of the level, as opposed to the …rst-di¤erence, of hours worked. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2004) show that Gali’s …ndings can be the result of misspeci…cation.
19innovation. N1 falls in the model with no adjustment costs, leading also to decreases in marginal
cost and in‡ation (…gure 5). The opposite happens in the labor frictions model: N2 rises sharply
on impact and N1 rises steadily, displaying a very persistent response. As a result hours increase
in response to a TFP shock, this is unusual in sticky price models. Sticky price models have been
associated to a negative labor input response to TFP, because the TFP increase allows …rms to
produce the same output with less labor input (since …rms are constrained in adjusting price). But
in the labor frictions model, the fraction of price constrained …rms is much smaller than in the
baseline New Keynesian models. More …rms are able to take advantage of the positive productivity
increase which leads to an increase in hours used. This model also displays stronger reactions of
output, interest rate, consumption and real wages.
If the shock to the economy is an increase in government purchases (…gure 6), marginal cost has
an opposite pattern between the two models, with in‡ation rising instead of falling in the model
with labor frictions. This occurs because the overtime work reaction is so strong on impact that it
is able to drive in‡ation up despite falling wages. It is curious that this is the only shock that has
stronger e¤ect on economic variables in the model with no adjustment costs.
We can also observe signi…cant di¤erences when comparing the two model’s impulse response
function to a monetary policy shock (…gure 7). The model without labor frictions displays very
strong reactions on impact of N1, consumption, wages and the nominal interest rate. The labor
frictions model on the other hand exhibits stronger reactions on impact of N2, marginal cost,
in‡ation, hours and output variables (because these variables are driven mostly by overtime work
which has strong reactions on impact to shocks in this model). Without frictions, we observe a
strong and immediate response of N1 and consumption, whereas in the model with frictions these
variables reactions only peak about 4 quarters after the change in monetary policy. Which is more
according to what the data suggests (see Trigari (2005) estimates). In both models however, the
peak response of in‡ation is immediate. This is in contradiction with most economists estimates:
Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) describe a two-year lag between policy actions and
their main e¤ect on in‡ation as ‘a common estimate’.
207.3 Okun’s law
Another interesting observation that can be made from these simulations, is the relation between
output and employment. In the no frictions model, we can observe that, except for the productivity
shock, employment deviates more in response to shocks than output (this can easily be seen by
looking at the standard deviation values in tables 17-19 or by a closer inspection of the impulse
response functions). This seems to be at odds with the empirical evidence, regressions of Okun’s law
estimate a 3% decrease in output for every 1% increase in the unemployment rate (Prachowny 1993).
Even the TFP shock is at odds with evidence, since employment and output are strongly positively
correlated in the data and in the model with no labor frictions these variables are negatively
correlated.
The impulse response functions and the moments of the model with labor frictions seem to be
consistent with Okun’s law, indicating that labor frictions in business cycle models are necessary
in order to accurately describe the output and employment dynamics observed in the data. It
also con…rms that changes in hours from employed workers (in this case the number of workers
in the overtime shift) as a strong motive why GDP may increase or decrease more rapidly than
unemployment decreases or increases.
7.4 Monetary and …scal policy
The observation from the impulse response functions of output and employment in the labor fric-
tions model has important implications for both monetary and …scal policy. We can observe that
for these shocks, employment displays a much weaker response than output, while in the case of a
TFP shock to the economy, employment increases about the same as output. The labor adjustment
cost model’s impulse response functions seem to indicate that …scal policy in particular (its e¤ect in
employment is really very small), is not very e¤ective in stimulating employment, output and total
hours worked do increase but only due to very large changes in the number of overtime workers.
Monetary policy shocks do seem to have quite a relevant e¤ect in employment dynamics in the
short-run but to a much smaller extent than in output, this indicates that care should be taken in
the elaboration of the monetary policy goals, output or employment stabilization is not indi¤erent.
Observing the TFP responses we can observe that the "jobless growth" phenomenon in the
labor frictions model seems to result from monetary and …scal shocks. In contrast in the overtime
21model with no labor adjustment costs "jobless growth" is a result of technology innovations.
8 Conclusion
This paper describes a NKPC model with straight time and overtime shifts. The introduction of
labor frictions allows the model to be consistent with both the micro evidence on the frequency of
price adjustment and the parameter values required to explain the comovement between in‡ation
and aggregate labor costs. This model implies that …rm’s marginal costs should be measured by
overtime work costs. Empirical estimations of the NKPC with overtime cost measures do not yield
coe¢cient estimates signi…cantly di¤erent from those obtained using the labor share. Unlike the
labor share, marginal costs measured in overtime are procyclical and seem to be Granger caused
by in‡ation, as predicted by the NKPC model. The results shown here show some promise in
measuring marginal costs in overtime work and its use should be the focus of future research.
The introduction of labor frictions signi…cantly alters employment and in‡ation dynamics. In
labor frictions model, in‡ation rises on impact in response to a TFP and government expenses
shock (the opposite happens in the absence of labor frictions). In this model, hours rise in response
to a positive TFP shock. Suggesting that a sticky price model that is consistent with the micro
evidence on price stickiness may no longer be characterized by a negative response from labor
to productivity shocks. In the case of a government expenses or monetary policy shock, most of
the ‡uctuations in hours is due to changes in overtime work and not employment numbers. The
model seems to generate too much volatility in overtime employment, particularly in the case of
government expenses and monetary shocks.
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269 Appendix
9.1 Data
The employment and hours data series used in this paper are aggregate data in U.S. nonagricultural
industries from the BLS’s Current Population Survey. Total employment is denoted as N, N0 will
denote the number of partial time workers (persons who worked 1 to 34 hours a week), N1 will denote
the number of full time workers (persons who worked 35 hours and over a week), …nally we denote
overtime employment as N2 (number of persons who worked 41 hours and over a week). Data for
N0 is only available for the period1976Q3-2006Q4; data for N is available for the period 1955Q2-
2006Q4, N1 and N2 spans the period 1955Q1-2006Q418. Data regarding employment numbers
was converted to quarterly by averaging monthly observations and was subsequentially seasonally
adjusted. Per capita variables were constructed by dividing by civilian noninstitutional population
NSA from the BLS.
Data for average weekly full-time hours (excludes persons working less than 35 hours a week)
and part time hours (average weekly hours by persons who worked 1 to 34 hours a week) are
available from 1976Q3-2006Q1, this was converted to quarterly by assuming a month to be equal
to 4.3 weeks and then summing the resulting monthly observations, these are non-seasonaly adjusted
series. Regular hours was calculated by assuming a 40 hour workweek for full-time workers. I then
constructed overtimehours by multiplying N1 by fulltimehours minus regularhours and dividing by
N2. N0_hrs denotes total part time hours and was constructed by multiplying N0 by part time
hours. N1_hrs denotes total regular hours and was constructed by multiplying N1 by regular hours.
N2_hrs denotes total overtime hours and was constructed by multiplying N2 by overtime hours.
N_hrs is the sum of N0_hrs, N1_hrs and N2_hrs. Average hours was constructed by dividing
N_hrs by N.
I now describe the construction of the timeseries used in the NKPC regressions in chapter 5.
The in‡ation measure is the log di¤erence of the GDP de‡ator, wage in‡ation is the log di¤erence
of compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector, commodity price in‡ation is the log
di¤erence of the producer price index (all commodities), the long-short interest rate spread was
constructed as the log of the 10 year treasury rate minus the log of the 1 year treasury rate. I detail
18I’m grateful to George Hall for sharing his data on full time and overtime employment from 1955 to 1992.
27below the series just mentioned and others used in the paper:
GS1 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate; source: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve system; 1953Q2-2007:Q1.
GS10 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate; source: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve system; 1953Q2-2007:Q1.
PPIACO Producer Price Index: All Commodities; source:BLS; 1921Q1-2007:Q1
CNP16OV Civilian Noninstitutional Population; source:BLS; 1948Q1-2007:Q1
COMPNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour; source:BLS; 1947Q1-2007:Q1.
GDP Gross Domestic Product; source:BEA; 1947Q1-2007:Q1.
Real GDP Gross Domestic Product; source:BEA; 1947Q1-2007:Q1
GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price De‡ator; source: BEA; 1947Q1-
2007:Q1.
GEXPND Government Current Expenditures; source: BEA; 1947Q1-2007:Q1.
PCEC Personal Consumption Expenditures; source: BEA; 1947Q1-2007:Q1.
FEDFUNDS E¤ective Federal Funds Rate; source: BEA; 1954M7-2007:M6.
GS1,GS10, PPIACO, CNP16OV, COMPFNB, GDP, Real GDP, GDPDEF, GEXPND, PCEC
and the FEDFUNDS were downloaded from the St. Louis Fed website, the remaining series were
downloaded from Economagic website. GS1,GS10, PPIACO, CNP16OV, COMPFNB and FED-
FEUNDS were converted to quarterly by averaging the monthly observations.
9.2 Representative agent’s utility function
Assume ￿1;t and ￿1;t are the probability of working just the straight time shift and the probability
of working both shifts respectively. Hence 1   ￿1;t   ￿2;t is the probability of being unemployed.
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De…ne N1;t to be the share of agents who work the straight time shift (full time employment)
and N2;t the share of agents who work both shifts(overtime employment). So N1;t = ￿1;t+ ￿2;t and
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Where a0 =  v 1
1 ￿;a1 =  v 1
1 ￿(1   h1)1 ￿;a2 =  v 1
1 ￿(1   h1   h2)1 ￿:
9.3 Steady State
9.3.1 Overtime model with Labor frictions
In steady state, (13), (14) and (19) reduce to:
N = (h1N1 ￿
1 + h2N1 ￿
2 )
H = ￿N1N1
￿ = 1=￿   (1   ￿N1)
From the production function it is simple to obtain Y:
Y = AN
And then obtain the steady state consumption from the resource constraint:
C = (1   sg)Y   H = w1h1N1 + w2h2N2
where sg=G/Y.
Steady state values for w1;w2;v and ￿ are obtained by solving the system of equations:
w2 = ((a2   a1)C￿)=h2
w1 = ((a1   a0)C￿)=h1
























Furthermore, it is useful to de…ne:








299.3.2 Overtime model without Labor frictions
Y, N, w1 and w2 remain the same. The steady state consumption is now:
C = (1   sg)Y
9.4 Log-Linear Expansions
From now on, I will use lower case letters or hats to denote variables in log deviation from the
steady state. I start by log-linearizing the representative agent …rst order conditions, (4), (5) and
(6):
ct = Etct+1   1
￿(it   Et￿t+1 + log￿) (A3)
^ w2;t = ￿ct (A4)
^ w1;t = ￿ct (A5)
The log-linearized aggregate production function, labor adjustment cost function and aggregate
resource constraint are:
Y yt = at + (1   ￿)h1N1 ￿
1 n1;t + (1   ￿)h2N1 ￿
2 n2;t (A6)
￿N1ht = n1;t+1   (1   ￿N1)n1;t (A7)
Y yt = Cct + sgY gt + Hht (A8)
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^ ￿i;t+1 =   ^ w1;t+1￿W1 + ^ w2;t+1￿W2 + yi;t+1￿Y   at+1￿A   n1;t+1(i)￿N1 (A10)







(1+￿)￿ N1 Et^ ￿t+1   1
￿ N1Et(it   Et￿t+1 + log￿) (A11)
with:
^ ￿t+1 =   ^ w1;t+1￿W1 + ^ w2;t+1￿W2 + yt+1￿Y   at+1￿A   n1;t+1￿N1 (A12)




(￿￿)j[pi;t+j   mci;t+j)] = 0 (A13)
yi;t   yt =  ￿pit (A14)
The linearized individual …rm and aggregate marginal costs conditions are:
30mct = ^ w2;t   (1 + BC)at   BDn1;t + BCyt (A15)
mci;t = mct   BDn1;t(i)   ￿BCpit (A16)
Under static indexing a …rm that does not optimally reset its price for J periods:




Substituting (A16) and A(17) in (A13) :






￿t+j + mct+j   BDn1;t+j(i)] (A18)
9.5 Aggregate price dynamics
I start by using i’s demand curve (A14) to express relative output as a function of the …rm’s relative
price, in order to write (A9) as:
Et[Q(L)n1;t+2(i)] = ￿Etpi;t+1 (A19)
Where the lag polynomial is
Q(L) = ￿   [1 + ￿ + (1   ￿(1   ￿N1))￿N1￿ 1
 N1]L + L2 (A20)
and
￿ = (1   ￿(1   ￿N1))￿￿y￿ 1
 N1:
Following Woodford (2005), I posit (and later verify) that:
p￿
i;t = p￿
t    N1n1;t(i) (A21)
n1;t+1(i) = ￿1n1;t(i) + ￿2pi;t (A22)
Calvo price staggering allows us to express the price index as:
Pt = [￿P1 ￿
t 1 + (1   ￿)(P￿
t )1 ￿]1=(1 ￿) (A23)
Recall that under static indexing:




The expectation when one integrates over all possible future states conditional upon the state
of the world at date t:
Etpi;t+1 = ￿[pi;t   Et￿t+1] + (1   ￿)Etp￿
i;t+1 (A24)





Using this and (A21) in (A24) yields:
Etpi;t+1 = ￿pi;t   (1   ￿)￿1 N1n1;t+1(i) (A26)
Together (A22) and (A26) form a system of 2 equations on two variables. In order to have
convergent dynamics both eigenvalues of the matrix in this system must be inside the unit circle.
Substituting (A22) and (A26) in (A19) it is possible to obtain, after some rearranging:
[1   ￿1￿N1 + ￿￿2
1   (1   ￿)￿1 N1(￿￿2   ￿)]n1;t(i)+
+[ ￿N1 + ￿￿2
1 + ￿￿1￿   ￿￿￿1
￿2   (1   ￿)￿1 N1(￿￿2   ￿)]￿2
￿1pi;t = 0 (A27)
The coe¢cients on n1;t(i) and pi;t must be zero.
[1   ￿1￿N1 + ￿￿2
1   (1   ￿)￿1 N1(￿￿2   ￿)] = 0 (A28)
[ ￿N1 + ￿￿2
1 + ￿￿1￿   ￿￿￿1
￿2   (1   ￿)￿1 N1(￿￿2   ￿)] = 0 (A29)




(￿￿)jn1;t+j(i) = (1   ￿￿￿1) 1n1;t(i) + ￿2
￿￿




Substitution of this in equation (A18):










￿N1 = 1 + ￿BC   BD￿2
￿￿
(1 ￿￿￿1) (A32)
The solution to this equation is of the conjectured form (A21) if and only if (A31) satis…es:
￿N1p￿








￿N1 N1 = BD
1 ￿￿
(1 ￿￿￿1) (A34)
One can now solve for the undetermined parameters ( ￿N1; N1;￿1;￿2) of the …rm’s optimal
decision rules, using (A28),(A29),(A32) and (A34). Like in Woodford, this system can be reduced
to a single equation for ￿1. Woodford (2005) shows that a non-explosive solution to the …rm’s
decision problem exists in the case of large enough adjustment costs.
To obtain the NKPC equation I now quasi-di¤erence (after dividing by ￿N1) equation (A33),
to yield:
32p￿
t = (1   ￿￿)￿ 1
N1mct + ￿￿Et￿t+1 + ￿￿Etp￿
t+1 (A35)
Finally use (A25) to substitute out the optimal price variable and obtain the NKPC:
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿mct










￿ is simply equal to
(1 ￿)(1 ￿￿)
￿ .
In a model with no capital and no labor frictions:






1 ￿+￿￿. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale (￿ = 0)





















































































35Figure 5: TFP shock




































































Figures 6: Government expense shock
































































36Key: —Model with labor frictions;   !   Model without labor Frictions
Figure 7: Monetary Policy shock


































































Key: —Model with labor frictions;   !   Model without labor Frictions
379.7. Tables
Table 1: Categories of worker types as percentage of civilian population
Variable Data range Mean
N_percapita SA 1955Q2:2006Q4 0.551
N0_percapita SA 1976Q3:2006Q4 0.148
N1_percapita SA 1955Q1:2006Q4 0.419
N2_percapita SA 1955Q1:2006Q4 0.158
Data for U.S. nonagricultural industries:N denotes total employment, N0 denotes persons at work 1!34
hours, N1 denotes persons at work 35 hours and over, N2 denotes persons at work 41 hours and over.
All variables are seasonally adjusted and converted to per capita terms using the civilian, noninstitutional 
population.
Table 2: Average quarterly hours per worker category
Variable Obs Mean
average hours NSA, all workers 1976Q1:2006Q4 508.548
part time hours NSA 1976Q3:2006Q4 64.8991
full time hours NSA 1976Q3:2006Q4 570.616
regular hours NSA 1976Q3:2006Q4 516
overtime hours NSA 1976Q3:2006Q4 155.049
Data for full!time hours excludes persons working less than 35 hours a week. Part time hours are average 
hours of persons at work 1!34 hours a week.  Regular hours was calculated by assuming a 40 hour weekly 
duration for the straight time shift. Overtime hours = (N1*(full time hours!regular hours) )/N2.
Quarterly values were obtained by  assuming a month to be equal to 4.3 weeks and then summing the 
resulting monthly observations, these are non!seasonaly adjusted series.









log_part time hours 0.0007 0.033
covariance term* 0.0006 0.057
log_N1_hrs 0.071 1
log_N1 0.071 1
log_regular hours 0 0




covariance term* 0.004 0.131
N_hrs denotes total hours worked in the nonagricultural industries.
N0_hrs denotes total part time hours worked in the nonagricultural industries.
N1_hrs denotes total regular hours worked in the nonagricultural industries.
N2_hrs denotes total overtime hours worked in the nonagricultural industries.
*in the covariance term the ratio is computed by multiplying the covariance of the number 
of workers with the average hours in the category by 2 and then dividing by the variance.
38Table 4:  U.S. Business cycle statistics














y denotes real GDP per capita, G is government current expenditures per capita, C is personal consumption 
expenditures per capita, FF is the federal funds rate, w is compensation per hour in the nonfarm business  
sector divided by the GDP price deflator, the inflation measure was constructed using the GDP price deflator.
A_N is a TFP measure (see note 12 in the paper for details). N, N0, N1 and N2 are the same series detailed in
table 1. N_hrs denotes total hours worked per capita. All series are in logs and were detrended with an  
HP filter (with the exception of inflation and FF).
Table 5: OLS regressions (with constant) on HP detrended real GDP




HP_log_N2  1.879 0.099
Table 6: micro evidence on the frequency of price adjustment
Sample fr implied T implied "
1. All Items
All prices 0.293 3.413 0.121
Regular prices 0.233 4.292 0.301
2. Core Items
All prices 0.26 3.846 0.220
Regular prices 0.207 4.831 0.379
The first colum is from Klenow and Kryvstov. and gives the mean fraction of changing 
monthly prices.
T is the implied mean number of months for which a price remains fixed.
The last column gives us the implied probability of a price being fixed for a quarter.
Table 7: Implication for price frequency of alternative assumptions about factor markets
implied values of "
gamma Homo. Fact.  Firm!specific capital DRS labor frictions
0.05 0.804 0.615 0.619 0.328
0.04 0.823 0.646 0.651 0.354
0.03 0.845 0.731 0.689 0.402
0.02 0.872 0.724 0.738 0.468
39Table 8: Implication for price frequency of the output share of the constrained factor 
implied values of teta
Firm!specific capital
# = 0.66 0.569
labor frictions
t1=200; N1=0.20 0.634
Table 9: Implication for price frequency of alternative parameter choices










Table 11: GMM nonlinear regressions of NKPC
coeficient standard errors Prob. J
















40Table 12: GMM linear regressions of NKPC
coeficient standard errors Prob. J




beta 0.980 0.023 0.070
gamma !0.005 0.011
3.overtimeshare_hrs





Table 13: OLS estimates of labor share on lagged inflation
coeficient P!value R2
pi_t!1  0.015 0.849  0.015
pi_t!2 !0.015 0.863  F!statistic
pi_t!3 0.015 0.868  0.477
pi_t!4 0.045 0.561
Table 14: OLS estimates of overtimeshare_h2 on lagged inflation
coeficient P!value R2
pi_t!1 0.377 0.336 0.206
pi_t!2 0.027 0.951 F!statistic
pi_t!3 !0.387 0.377 0.000
pi_t!4 !0.782 0.047 
Table 15: OLS regressions of inflation on present value of marginal costs
coeficient standard errors Adj. R2
1. PV(labor share)
gamma 0.014 0.011 0.002
2. PV(overtimeshare_h2)
gamma  !0.017 0.001 0.741
Table 16: OLS regressions of changes in inflation on changes of present value of marg. costs
coefficient standard errors Adj. R2
1. 'PV(labor share)
gamma 0.015 0.013 0.001
2. 'PV(overtimeshare_h2)
gamma 0.015 0.002 0.17
41Table 17: Business cycle statistics ! TFP shock
relative  contemporaneous relative  contemporaneous
standard correlation standard correlation
 deviations with output deviations with output
c 1.08 0.95 1.59 1
n1 0.78 0.65 0.65 !1
n2 3.20 0.17 0.65 !1
w1 1.08 0.95 1.59 1
inflation 0.05 !0,28 0.06 !1
y 1 1 1 1
h 2.35 0.87
mc 0.87 0.64 0.06 !1
i 0.13 0.84 0.04 1
hrs 0.55 0.93 0.65 !1
a 0.66 1.00 1.43 1
Table 18: Business cycle statistics ! G shock
relative  contemporaneous relative  contemporaneous
standard correlation standard correlation
 deviations with output deviations with output
c 2.43 !0,98 0.54 !1
n1 0.60 0.63 1.49 1
n2 9.05 0.95 1.49 1
w1 2.43 !0,98 0.54 !1
inflation 0.04 !0,24 0.05 !1
y 1 1 1 1
h 1.80 0.88
mc 0.67 0.66 0.05 !1
i 0.12 0.91 0.05 1
hrs 1.23 1.00 1.49 1
g 11.15 1.00 6.70 1
Table 19: Business cycle statistics ! M shock
relative  contemporaneous relative  contemporaneous
standard correlation standard correlation
 deviations with output deviations with output
c 0.80 0.80 1.59 1
n1 0.92 0.46 1.49 1
n2 9.77 0.85 1.49 1
w1 0.80 0.80 1.59 1
inflation 0.15 0.86 0.15 1
y 1 1 1 1
h 3.91 0.89
mc 3.59 0.94 2.09 1
i 0.08 !0,41 0.58 !1
hrs 1.25 0.99 1.49 1
v 0.36 !0,99 0.93 !1
Model with labor frictions Model without labor frictions
Model with labor frictions Model without labor frictions
Model with labor frictions Model without labor frictions
42